

It further assumes that Ukrainian forces will have the mine-clearing and bridging capabilities needed to move relatively rapidly through prepared defensive positions. It also assumes that Ukraine will have integrated enough tanks and armored personnel carriers of various sorts into its units to support extended mechanized maneuver, that Ukrainian mechanized units will have sufficient ammunition of all sorts including artillery, and that Ukraine will be able to conduct long-range precision strikes with HIMARS and other similar systems integrated with and supporting maneuver operations as it has done before. That task is daunting and larger than any offensive effort Ukraine has hitherto attempted (four Ukrainian brigades were reportedly used in the Kharkiv counter-offensive, for example). This report is based on a number of assumptions about Ukrainian capabilities that ISW does not, as a matter of policy, attempt to assess or report on. It assumes, in particular, that Ukraine will be able to conduct a coordinated multi-brigade mechanized offensive operation making full use of the reported nine brigades being prepared for that operation. This report outlines the current Russian order of battle (ORBAT) in Ukraine, assesses the offensive and defensive capabilities of Russian force groupings along the front, and discusses major factors that may complicate Russian defensive operations in the event of a Ukrainian counteroffensive. ISW is publishing a special edition campaign assessment today, April 23. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Ĭlick here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. KaganĬlick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Karolina Hird, George Barros, and Frederick W. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 23, 2023
